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The Robert E. Hudec Article on Global Trade
Facilitating Preferential Trade Agreements between
Developed and Developing Countries: A Case for
“Enabling” the Enabling Clause
Won-Mog Choi and Yong-Shik Lee
ABSTRACT
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been a salient feature of the
world trading system in recent decades, and most of the RTAs in force
include developing countries. To assist developing countries with
economic development, the Enabling Clause of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows developing countries to enter into
RTAs on favorable terms. The Enabling Clause has not been widely used,
however. Nor has it been successful in achieving its objectives. This
paper examines the reasons behind this apparent failure of the Enabling
Clause and proposes regulatory reforms, including a revision of the
Enabling Clause and the revitalization of paragraph 10 of GATT Article
XXIV.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has become a
salient feature of the multilateral trading system. In the early 1990s there
was a rapid increase in the number of RTAs, and their numbers have
continued to increase without subsiding.1 As of August 2010, as many as
194 RTAs were in force.2 RTAs are an important exception to the most
favored nation (MFN) requirement of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) Article I.3 GATT Article XXIV provides legal cover
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1. Regional
Trade
Agreements,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
2. Wog-Mon Choi & Yong-Shik Lee, Appendix to Facilitating Preferential Trade
Agreements between Developed and Developing Countries: A Case for “Enabling” the
Enabling Clause, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2012) [hereinafter Appendix].
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
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for RTAs that liberalize “substantially all” trade among the signatories
and do not raise trade barriers against non-member countries.4
The Enabling Clause5 also favors developing countries entering into
RTAs by relaxing some of the requirements under Article XXIV. Article
XXIV facilitates RTAs among developing countries to promote their
economic development.6
Despite this regulatory preference, however, the Enabling Clause
has not been widely used. Although 86.5% of all RTAs in force involve
one or more developing countries as members, and nearly half of all
RTAs in force involve only developing countries, the Enabling Clause
has been invoked as legal cover for only 15.4% of all RTAs in force.7 In
total, the Enabling Clause has been used for less than one-third of RTAs
involving only developing countries, despite its substantial preference for
developing countries.8 This raises the question of whether the Enabling
Clause can effectively assist developing countries by facilitating RTAs.
This article addresses this important question and examines why the
Enabling Clause has not been widely used by developing countries,
despite the legal preference it shows to developing countries entering into
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. GATT Article I prohibits discriminatory treatment in
trade based on the origin of the product. Article I.1 provides: “With respect to customs
duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or
exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports,
and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to
all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”
Id. art. I, ¶ 1.
4. Id. art. XXIV, ¶¶ 5, 8. See generally Mitsuo Matsushita & Y.S. Lee,
Proliferation of Free Trade Agreements and Some Systemic Issues - In Relation to the
WTO Disciplines and Development Perspectives, 1 L. & DEV. REV. 22, 31–33 (2008)
(stating that GATT article XXIV ¶ 8 is unclear as to the meaning and measure of
“substantially all” trade, for which the 1979 addition of the “Enabling Clause” added
clarity by relaxing the “substantially all trade” provision by exempting less-developed
members from adhering to the requirement of liberalizing substantially all trade as long as
they offer a mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs).
5. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, ¶ 2(c), L/4903 (Dec. 3, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D.
(26th Supp.) at 203, ¶ 1 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause] (“Notwithstanding the
provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such
treatment to other contracting parties.”). Containing the “Enabling Clause” at paragraphs
one through four, this document is one of the four Tokyo Round agreements called the
“Agreements relating to the Framework for the Conduct of International Trade” and has
been incorporated into WTO agreements.
6. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 4.
7. Appendix, supra note 2.
8. See infra section II.
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RTAs. If it has not been successful in achieving its stated objectives, then
the Clause should be revised. Section II will examine the legal
requirements of GATT Article XXIV and the legal interpretation of the
Enabling Clause. Section III will discuss the possible reasons why the
Enabling Clause has not been widely used and will propose regulatory
reforms that may assist developing countries to grow through preferential
trade agreements (PTAs).
II. GATT ARTICLE XXIV AND THE ENABLING CLAUSE
A. ARTICLE XXIV
For an RTA covering trade in goods to be consistent with the
requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO), GATT Article
XXIV requires that parties to the agreement must eliminate all tariffs and
other restrictive regulations on “substantially all the trade” between
them. 9 In other words, Article XXIV authorizes only fully-liberalizing
free trade agreements (FTAs). The various viewpoints regarding the
correct interpretation of the phrase “substantially all” can largely be
subsumed under the labels “quantitative approach” and “qualitative
approach.” 10 Several arguments have been articulated under the
quantitative approach. One such argument is that trade barriers with
respect to greater than 80% of trade between RTA parties should be
eliminated to satisfy the “substantially all” requirement. 11 Another
argument advanced is that barriers with respect to greater than 95% of
trade at the level of the Harmonized System 6 unit must be eliminated.12
9. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 8 (allowing customs unions and free-trade
areas to eliminate restrictive regulations of commerce on substantially all the trade
between them, except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV,
XV, and XX).
10. E.g., Matsushita & Lee, supra note 4, at 31–33 (stating that there has been
controversy regarding whether the term “substantially all” requires a quantitative or
qualitative measure of compliance in trade restrictions).
11. See Won-Mog Choi, Legal Problems of Making Regional Trade Agreements with
Non-WTO-Member States, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 825, 828–29 (2005). See generally Treaties
Establishing a European Economic Community and a European Atomic Energy
Community (ECT) ¶ 30, L/778 (Nov. 29, 1957), GATT B.I.S.D. (6th Supp.) at 70, 99
(1958) (“[T]he Six had proposed the following definition: a free-trade area should be
considered as having been achieved for substantially all the trade when the volume of
liberalized trade reached 80 per cent of total trade.”). For a comparison of the arguments
for and against a qualitative measure of trade restrictions see WTO Secretariat, Systemic
Issues Related to “Substantially All the Trade”, WT/REG/W/21/Add.1 (Dec. 2, 1997).
Supporting the EC’s original argument, the EFTA States noted that the phrase
“substantially all trade” was not the same as “trade in substantially all products.” Id.
12. See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Communication from Australia,
WT/REG/W/22/Add.1 (Apr. 24, 1998) (elaborating on Australia’s argument that
“substantially all trade” should be defined as an agreement with at least 95% of all the sixdigit tariff lines listed in the Harmonized System). The 95% figure is arbitrary, but would
lead to more liberalized trade between parties, and the Harmonized System is suggested

4

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 21:1

A third argument is that the level of trade barrier elimination can be
determined only after taking rules of origin into consideration13—i.e., if
rules of origin are implemented more strictly, more trade barriers should
be eliminated.14 Rather than relying on an absolute quantitative threshold
such as 80% or 90%, those advocating a qualitative approach have
responded that the range of tariff elimination should cover even those
sectors in which there is little trade between the parties. In particular, if
lack of trade in an area is due to trade barriers, that area should not be
excluded from the scope of tariff elimination. 15 As a result, those
advocating a qualitative approach argue that the “substantially all”
criterion should be assessed based on the present as well as potential
future trade between RTA parties, not just trade that is currently taking
place.16
Despite this variation in criteria, there has been a broad consensus
that most of the RTA signatory parties’ trade in goods must be subject to
the tariff elimination requirement. As a result, mutual exchange of
favorable treatment—the elimination of mutual trade barriers to goods—
is a necessary condition of concluding an RTA under the authority of
Article XXIV. Third-party countries, however, will still be subjected to
such barriers. Consequently, the existence of an RTA will result in lessfavorable trade conditions for countries not a signatory to the RTA. This
strays from the MFN treatment obligation under the GATT.
In order to promote liberalization, the WTO Agreement created an
exception to the MFN principle that allowed the establishment of RTAs.
Paragraph 5 of GATT Article XXIV stipulates:
[T]he provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories
of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or
because it is a neutral system that counts all goods regardless of whether the parties
actually import or export the listed products. See id.
13. See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Statement by the Delegation of
Hong Kong, China on Systemic Issues, WT/REG/W/27 (July 8, 1998) (arguing that the
preferential rules of origin are not real “origin” rules but are instead related to trading
arrangements such as RTAs’ definition of “substantially all trade”).
14. See Choi, supra note 11.
15. See, e.g., Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note by the Secretariat:
Synopsis of “Systemic” Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG/W/37, ¶¶
52, 54–55 (Mar. 2, 2000) (stating that restrictive regulations of commerce should be
eliminated with respect to “substantially all the trade” in originating products between
parties, and that the qualitative approach requires that no section be precluded from intraRTA liberalization). See generally Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas: European Free
Trade Association, ¶¶ 47–58, L/1235 (June 4, 1960), GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 83
(1961). The GATT Working Party’s evaluation of the Stockholm Convention, the
Agreement establishing the EFTA, also argued that by excluding the agricultural sector, a
“major sector of economic activity,” the EFTA violated the GATT obligation to
substantially include all areas in the elimination of tariff and non-tariff measures. See id.;
Matsushita & Lee, supra note 4, at 31–32 (discussing trade liberalization regarding
agriculture).
16. See Choi, supra note 11.
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the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs
union or a free-trade area.17

Without this exception, WTO members would be prevented from
becoming parties to RTAs.
B. THE ENABLING CLAUSE
For many developing countries considering regional trade
integration, full compliance with Article XXIV’s “substantially all the
trade” requirement is a demanding task, given the desire to protect their
infant industries. 18 Through the Enabling Clause, however, the GATT
contracting parties have permitted grants of special treatment for the
benefit of developing countries.19 Before the enactment of the Enabling
Clause, special treatment had been accorded to developing countries on a
case-by-case basis through a series of waivers. After the Enabling Clause
was codified, these waivers became a permanent feature in the GATT
system, with the Enabling Clause serving as a permanent and substantive
legal basis for according special treatment to developing countries.20 This
allows developing countries to enter into PTAs, which lower trading
barriers between them, without fulfilling Article XXIV’s requirement of
full liberalization of “substantially all the trade.”21
Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause establishes that:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of the General Agreement,
contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable
treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to
other contracting parties.”22 Paragraph 2 of the Enabling Clause specifies
which preferential and differential treatments are allowed:
(a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to
products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized
System of Preferences,
(b) Differential and more favourable treatment granted with respect to the
provisions of the General Agreement concerning certain non-tariff measures
governed by the provisions of instruments multilaterally negotiated under the
auspices of the GATT;
(c) Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed
contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs . . . ;
(d) Special treatment on the least developed among the developing countries in

17. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 5.
18. There has been much debate about the validity of protecting infant industries as
means to develop an economy. Nevertheless, GATT provisions authorize infant industry
protection and allow developing countries to take measures to promote infant industries
under provisions such as Article XVIII. See YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 56–62 (2006).
19. See Matsushita & Lee, supra note 4, at 31–33.
20. See Choi, supra note 11, at 851–53.
21. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 8.
22. Enabling Clause, supra note 5, ¶ 1.
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the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing
countries.23

Paragraph 3 of the Enabling Clause further stipulates that such
differential treatment is permitted only under the condition that “any
differential and more favourable treatment provided . . . shall be designed
to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not to
raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other
contracting parties.”24
Paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) regulates RTAs “amongst”
developing countries, which are a form of “regional or global
arrangements . . . for the mutual reduction or elimination of
tariffs . . . .”25 It should be noted that what this provision exempts from
the MFN obligation are RTAs entered into “amongst less-developed
contracting parties.” 26 This means that only less-developed countries
that are also members of the WTO are covered by this provision. As a
result, this exception does not cover an RTA in which one or more of the
parties are not members of the WTO or are more-developed countries.27
Developing countries can use the Enabling Clause to their advantage
in entering into RTAs. All WTO members can derogate from the MFN
principle in an RTA as long as the parties to the trade mutually eliminate
tariffs across “substantially all trade.” 28 This is allowed under GATT
Article XXIV for RTAs among WTO members. The Enabling Clause,
however, allows developing countries to form an RTA that mutually
eliminates or reduces tariffs, without requiring that they do so across
“substantially all trade.”29 This allows developing countries to establish
RTAs that eliminate or reduce tariffs in certain product sectors while
keeping existing tariffs in place for those perceived as vulnerable to
foreign competition. 30 Developed countries are not accorded this
privilege.31
23. Id. ¶ 2(a)–(d) (emphasis added).
24. Id. ¶ 3(a).
25. Id. ¶ 2(c). Another decision by WTO members provided a legal ground for an
exception from the GATT MFN Treatment obligation. See General Council Decision,
Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, Decision on Waiver,
WT/L/304 (June 17, 1999). This decision did enable developing country members to give
general system of preference (GSP) tariff treatment to products from least developed
countries, but it did not involve the RTA issue.
26. Enabling Clause, supra note 5, ¶ 2(c) (emphasis added). Of course, here “lessdeveloped contracting parties” means “less-developed countries which are parties to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.” GATT, supra note 3, app. I, art. XXIX.
27. See Won-Mog Choi, Regional Economic Integration in East Asia: Prospect and
Jurisprudence, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49, 75 (2003).
28. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶¶ 5, 8.
29. See Enabling Clause, supra note 5.
30. See id.
31. See GATT, supra note 3, art. I (requiring MFN treatment for all contracting
parties).
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For example, the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) does
not require tariffs to be eliminated, only that they be reduced to between
0% and 5% of current levels within 10 years, in accordance with the
phased Trade Liberalisation Programme (TLP). 32 Furthermore, items
kept on the Sensitive List by each contracting state are excluded from
this reduction program. 33 In the Pakistan-Malaysia FTA, 34 Pakistan
agreed to eliminate tariffs on only 43.2% of current imports from
Malaysia by 2012, whereas Malaysia is expected to eliminate tariffs on
78% of imports from Pakistan.35 In both cases, the Enabling Clause, not
Article XXIV, was invoked as legal cover for the trade agreement.36
Subject to certain conditions, additional benefits may also be
granted by the Enabling Clause with regard to non-tariff measures. When
forming RTAs, developing countries that are WTO members may choose
between the “mutual reduction” and “mutual elimination” of non-tariff
measures “in accordance with criteria or conditions which may be
prescribed by the contracting parties.”37 Such non-tariff measures include
import permits, technical measures, and even certain taxes (on top of
tariffs) imposed on imported products. Tax reduction or elimination can
involve exempting certain exports of signatory parties from generally
applicable taxes paid even by local producers. This exemption
disadvantages any other imported products in terms of taxation. Even if
this type of measure does not violate the national treatment obligation of
the GATT, it may breach the MFN treatment obligation with regard to
internal measures. 38 The Enabling Clause thus allows the Contracting
Parties to prescribe certain criteria or conditions for this reduction or

32. See Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area, Jan. 6, 2004, http://www.saarcsec.org/userfiles/saftaagreement.pdf, (signed by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka).
33. See id. art. 7. The sensitive list of each contracting state includes 150 to 1295
items. Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, S. ASIAN ASS’N FOR REGIONAL
COOPERATION
(Mar.
29,
2011),
http://www.saarcsec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=35 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
34. See Agreement Between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and
the Government of Malaysia for a Closer Economic Partnership, Pak.-Malay., Nov. 8,
2007, http://www.commerce.gov.pk/PMFTA/PAk-Malaysia-FTA(TXT).pdf [hereinafter
Closer Economic Partnership Agreement]. This agreement was the first bilateral FTA
between two Muslim countries. See GOV’T OF PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF COM.,
http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page_id=195 (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) (discussing the
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement for Closer Economic Partnership between Pakistan
and Malaysia).
35. See Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 34.
36. Appendix, supra note 2.
37. See Enabling Clause ¶ 2(c) (emphasis omitted).
38. See generally Aaditya Mattoo, National Treatment in the GATS: Corner-Stone or
Pandora’s Box?, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 107 (1997) (explaining the interpretation of the
national treatment obligation and most favored nation treatment in the GATT, counterpart
agreement entered into force by the World Trade Organization in 1995).
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elimination of non-tariff barriers, giving a type of “waiver” to the MFN
violation problem.
The least developed countries (LDCs) among the developing
countries 39 forming an RTA can gain even greater benefits from the
Enabling Clause. Under paragraph 2, subparagraph (d), it is possible to
accord “special treatment [to] the least developed among the developing
countries in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of
developing countries.”40 This provision permits WTO members to give
“special treatment” to the least developed parties to an RTA that is
“entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties” within the
context of paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of the Enabling Clause. 41 In
particular, the least developed parties to such an RTA may be required to
make tariff reductions on a smaller scale than those required of other
developing country parties.42
For example, under the SAFTA, LDCs are required to reduce tariffs
to 30% for the initial two-year period and then to between 0% and 5%
within an eight-year period. On the other hand, non-LDCs must reduce
tariffs to 20% for the initial two-year period and then to between 0% and
5% within a shorter five-year period.43 Under the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA), the six original members (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) of ASEAN must
eliminate tariffs by 2010, and the new members (Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar, and Vietnam) must do so by 2015; but tariffs for certain
sensitive products may be eliminated by 2018.44
III. CASE FOR “ENABLING” THE ENABLING CLAUSE
A. LIMITATIONS OF THE ENABLING CLAUSE
The current legal framework of the Enabling Clause, which allows
preferential treatment for RTAs only among developing WTO member
countries, deserves criticism. Many LDCs cannot practically enter into
the WTO to take advantage of this preferential treatment, because they
do not have the capacity to implement the other obligations of WTO
membership. 45 If RTAs formed between WTO members and non39. Unless indicated otherwise, “developing countries” throughout this paper are
understood to include LDCs.
40. See Enabling Clause, supra note 5, ¶ 2(d).
41. Id. ¶ 2(c).
42. For a detailed discussion, see Choi, supra note 11, at 852–56.
43. See Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area, supra note 32, art. 7.1.
44. See Protocol to Amend the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential
Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) for the Elimination of
Import Duties, art. 1, Jan. 31, 2003, http://www.asean.org/14183.htm (last visited Sept. 28,
2011).
45. See Choi, supra note 11, at 855-856.

2012]

“ENABLING” THE ENABLING CLAUSE

9

members are not given preferential treatment, least developed countries
will have considerable difficulty keeping pace with the rapid proliferation
of regionalism that has come to characterize the world economy. 46
Moreover, limiting the preferential treatment given by the Enabling
Clause to only RTAs formed solely between WTO members and LDCs
that are also WTO members effectively induces WTO members to
discriminate among LDCs. 47 This contravenes the primary aim of the
Enabling Clause, which is to give enhanced protection to a single
common group of countries classified as the “least developed.”48
Even if all the signatories to an RTA are WTO members, another
problem exists. If even one signatory to the RTA is not a developing
country, the agreement is not eligible for benefits provided under
paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of the Enabling Clause. In contrast with
developing countries, developed countries are not enabled to accord
differential and more favorable treatment to less developed countries
when forming RTAs with them.
Because the Enabling Clause does not apply to RTAs formed
between developed and developing countries, there is no legal basis on
which a developing or least developed country may ask for a smaller
tariff reduction when forming an RTA with developed countries. The
strict requirement of tariff elimination with respect to “substantially all
the trade” under GATT Article XXIV applies to such cases, and
developing or least developed countries forming RTAs with developed
countries will be required to eliminate most trade barriers against their
developed partners.49
In this regard, the provisions of Part IV of GATT (Trade and
Development), which stipulate differential treatment to developing
country members, 50 may also be ineffective. Despite its ambitious
objectives to raise the “standards of living” of less developed contracting
parties—a task that is “particularly urgent” 51 —and to “enable lessdeveloped contracting parties to use special measures to promote their
trade and development,”52 Part IV does not include any provisions for
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV.
50. Many have viewed the provisions of Part IV and commitments described therein
as aspirational and not legally binding on WTO members. See ROBERT HUDEC,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 57–58 (1987); MITSUO
MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY
766 (2d ed. 2006); PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE: A COMMENTARY 267, 270 (2005); M.J. TREBILCOCK & R. HOWSE, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 475 (3d ed. 2005).
51. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XXXVI, ¶ 1(a).
52. See id. art. XXXVI, ¶ 1(f).
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commitments in the context of negotiating RTAs; the only commitments
in Part IV are related to negotiations for the reduction or elimination of
tariffs under GATT Articles XXVIII, XXVIIIbis, and XXXIII—not
Article XXIV. Therefore, notwithstanding Part IV, GATT Article XXIV
applies to developing countries without any modification.
This means that nothing is in fact enabled by the Enabling Clause
with respect to RTAs between developed and developing countries and
RTAs between WTO Members (developing or developed) and nonmember developing countries. This is inconsistent with the statement of
principle in the first paragraph of the Enabling Clause, which reads:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement,
contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable
treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to
other contracting parties.” 53
Paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of the Enabling Clause effectively
nullifies paragraph 1 for RTAs between developed and developing
countries.54 As such, even if a developed country member of the WTO is
willing to form an RTA with a developing country that offers smaller
tariff reductions that do not satisfy the “substantially all the trade”
requirement, no provision in the WTO Agreements would support such
an effort. This legal constraint may discourage many developed country
members of the WTO from forming RTAs with the poorest nations in the
world. It may also discourage the poorest countries from making efforts
to integrate their economies with those of developed country members of
the WTO. This may be one of the reasons why paragraph 2,
subparagraph (c) of the Enabling Clause has not been widely used and
why only a small number of RTAs have been reported under it thus far.55
Statistics seem to bear out this disabling effect. Less than 40% of all
RTAs in force have been formed between developed and developing
countries and it is indeed very rare to find RTAs made between
developed countries and LDCs,56 except for PTAs57 formed between the
European Union and its former African colonies. 58 Forming PTAs
between developed countries and LDCs can offer considerable benefits to
the latter by providing them access to the affluent markets of developed
countries, without compromising their industrial growth potentials by
53. See Enabling Clause, supra note 5, ¶ 1.
54. See id. ¶ 2 n.2 (noting that the list of measures in paragraph two is an exhaustive
menu of the approved measures that lead to application of paragraph one, whereas
anything not mentioned in paragraph two requires WTO members’ ad hoc approval).
55. Only 15.4% of all RTAs invoke the Enabling Clause as legal cover. See
Appendix, supra note 2.
56. See id.
57. Again, PTAs denote RTAs with limited trade liberalization, whereas FTAs
authorized under Article XXIV require full liberalization of “substantially all the trade.”
58. See Appendix, supra note 2.
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prematurely opening their markets to the global economy.59 These PTAs
are not currently possible, either under the provisions of GATT Article
XXIV, which requires the liberalization of “substantially all the trade,” or
under the limited Enabling Clause, which gives preferential treatment
only to RTAs formed solely between developing country members.
Should the Enabling Clause necessarily enable developed countries
to provide PTA preferences to developing countries and LDCs? It could
be argued that it is unnecessary to change the Enabling Clause because
developed countries can already offer Generalized Systems of
Preferences (GSPs) to a large number of these countries in order to assist
their economic development by providing preferential trade terms. 60
Extensive GSP schemes, such as the European Union’s “Everything-butArms (EBA)” preferential trade scheme, have been devised in favor of
LDCs.61 It can be further argued that non-discriminatory GSP schemes
represent a better device for providing trade preferences to developing
countries than inherently selective and discriminatory RTAs. 62 Indeed,
granting trade preferences through PTAs would benefit only those
developing countries and LDCs engaged in PTAs and hinder those that
are not. 63 Furthermore, the limited use of the Enabling Clause, even
among developing countries,64 suggests that it may not be necessary for
developed countries to grant trade preferences under the Enabling Clause.
59. See Choi, supra note 11, at 851–53.
60. For more information on GSP schemes, see generally About GSP, UNITED
NATIONS
CONF.
ON
TRADE
&
DEV.
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1 (last visited Sept.
24, 2011).
61. The EBA scheme by the European Union is an exemplary trade concession
scheme for LDCs. It is an initiative of the European Union that allows all imports (except
for armaments) to the European Union from LDCs to be admitted duty-free and quotafree. See Generalized System of Preferences: Everything but Arms, EUR. TRADE
COMMISSION (last updated Oct. 29, 2009) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wideragenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/everything-butarms/index_en.htm.
62. See Generalized System of Preferences, L/3545 (June 25, 1971), GATT B.I.S.D.
(18th Supp.) at 24, 25 (1971) (“[g]eneralized, non-discriminatory, non-reciprocal
preferential tariff treatment in the markets of developed countries for products originating
in developing countries. . . .”), construed in Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
¶¶
142–47
WT/DS246/AB/R
(Apr.
7,
2004),
available
at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/ec-preferences(ab).pdf
(interpreting
the
elements described in the Preamble of the 1971 Decision—“generalized,” “nondiscriminatory,” and “nonreciprocal”—as binding requirements for GSPs); see also
Lorand Bartels, The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the European
Community’s GSP Program, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 518 (2003).
63. See Y.S. Lee, Reconciling RTAs with the WTO Multilateral Trading System:
Case for a New Sunset Requirement on RTAs and Development Facilitation, 45 J. WORLD
TRADE 629, 632 (2011).
64. Note that less than one third of all RTAs made solely between developing
countries have invoked the Enabling Clause. See Appendix, supra note 2.
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Why is the Enabling Clause not widely used, even among
developing countries? Two possible reasons may be, first, the prevalence
of the neoclassical economic argument since the 1980s, and second, the
decline of the infant industry promotion argument in economics. 65
Because free trade and extensive foreign direct investment, rather than
trade protection and state facilitation of infant industries, have been
advocated as means of economic development, an increasing number of
developing countries have been negotiating FTAs entailing full trade
liberalization, rather than PTAs entailing limited trade liberalization. 66
Additionally, Eastern European countries, particularly former Soviet
republics, have been pursuing complete trade liberalization and economic
integration among themselves, rather than PTAs.67
B. CASE FOR REFORM
Should developed countries be authorized to enter into PTAs with
developing countries, with limited trade liberalization? If authorized to
enter into PTAs, more developed countries may be willing to grant trade
preferences to developing countries. Unlike GSP schemes, which only
allow the unilateral provision of trade preferences, PTAs allow
developed countries to receive some reciprocal trade preferences. The
very objective of the Enabling Clause supports providing such an
inducement; the Enabling Clause was created to “enable,” not to
“obligate,” countries to grant trade preferences to developing countries.68
As such, enabling developed countries to grant trade preferences through
PTAs under the Enabling Clause is likely to benefit developing countries,
particularly LDCs.69
The MFN principle may be further eroded if developed countries are
allowed to enter into PTAs with developing countries. This may well be
another ground for objection with respect to the proposed expansion of
the Enabling Clause. The erosion of the MFN principle has already taken
place to a significant degree, however, as hundreds of RTAs have been
65. The neoclassical economic policy stance, often referred as “Washington
Consensus,” reaffirms that the market promotes economic efficiency and fair social
distribution. This stance has become the dominant, mainstream academic position
worldwide, particularly after the 1980s, and also influenced the positions of international
economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank,
and the WTO. With respect to trade, the pursuit of free trade is an important part of the
neoliberal economic stance. See Y.S. LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 51–53 (2009).
66. See id.
67. As many as 26 bilateral FTAs have been formed among the former Soviet
republics and put in effect. See Appendix, supra note 2.
68. See Enabling Clause, supra note 5, ¶ 1.
69. Developed countries, particularly the United States, have been inclined to pursue
full trade liberalization, not PTAs with partial trade liberalization, with developing
countries. See LEE, supra note 65, at 51–53.
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formed since the 1990s.70 Thus, erosion of the MFN principle should not
be considered solely in the context of expanding the authorization of
PTAs to include developed countries under the Enabling Clause; instead,
it should be considered in the context of the current system, which
already authorizes RTAs on a permanent basis.71
1. Revision of the Enabling Clause
As discussed above, in this era of rapidly proliferating RTAs, it is
necessary to enable developed countries to accord differential and more
favorable treatment to developing countries when they form RTAs with
one another. One way to allow the inclusion of developed countries in
PTA arrangements would be to revise the current language of the
Enabling Clause. Specifically, paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of the
Enabling Clause could be amended to enable any member of the WTO to
reduce or eliminate tariffs for its developing country partners when
forming PTAs, regardless of whether those partners are WTO members.
This would also allow the reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures
in favor of developing countries, in accordance with any criteria or
conditions set. Specifically, the authors propose the following
amendment to paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of the Enabling Clause:
(c) Regional or global arrangements entered into between contracting parties
and less developed countries for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs
and, in accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of nontariff measures on products imported from one another;

The operative language of the amended clause is the phrase “less
developed countries.” This amendment would allow all WTO members,
whether developed or developing, the flexibility to reduce tariffs in the
formation of RTAs, not only with other developing country members of
the WTO, but also with non-member developing countries. It would also
enable WTO members to accord a further degree of flexibility to the
LDCs forming the RTA, pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (d).
2. Approval and Control Mechanism in GATT Article XXIV,
Paragraph 10
Another way to allow flexibility in tariff reductions in the formation
of PTAs involving less developed countries would be to revitalize the
special approval procedure under paragraph 10 of GATT Article XXIV,
which reads:
The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority approve

70. See Lee, supra note 63, at 633.
71. See id. at 637–41 (providing a detailed discussion of the arguments in favor of
introducing a requirement that RTAs contain a sunset clause).
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proposals which do not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 9
inclusive, provided that such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union
or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article.72

This provision originates from paragraph 6 of Article 44 of the
International Trade Organization (ITO) Charter.73 Under that provision,
ITO members could approve by a “two-thirds majority of the Members
present and voting” the formation of RTAs that did not “fully comply”
with the requirements under Article 44.74 According to an opinion of the
subcommittee responsible for the provision, paragraph 6 of Article 44
had the effect of “enabl[ing] the Organization to approve the
establishment of customs unions and free trade areas which include nonMembers.” 75 Moreover, those states that supported giving automatic
permission under Article 44 only to trade areas “between the territories of
Members” asserted that paragraph 6 would allow “the formation of
customs unions and free trade areas which had one or more nonMembers but would give the Organization an essential degree of control”
over such agreements.76 This demonstrates that some states were in favor
of allowing the formation of free trade areas between Members and nonMembers.
The response of the GATT states to the 1951 Nicaragua-El Salvador
FTA demonstrates this “approval and control” process in action.77 When
the FTA was formed, Nicaragua was a GATT Member, but El Salvador
72. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 10.
73. It can be said that the WTO is in fact the long-delayed successor to the ITO
project. The ITO Charter was agreed upon at the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Employment in Havana in March 1948. The negotiators expected the ITO, which was to
be created by the Charter, to be “the institutional framework to which the GATT . . . would
be attached.” However, the U.S. Congress “refused to approve the ITO Charter[,] and that
charter was declared dead by 1951.” Since then, “the GATT, which came into
(provisional) force in 1948, became the focus of attention as a possible institution through
which nations could solve some of their trade problems.” See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1998).
74. See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, art. 44, ¶ 6, Mar. 24,
1948, in United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 21,
1947–Mar. 24, 1948, Final Act and Related Documents, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78 (1948)
(“The Organization may, by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting,
approve proposals which do not fully comply with the requirements of the preceding
paragraphs, provided that such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union or of a
free-trade area in the sense of this Article.”). Later, to reconcile the text of GATT with that
of the ITO Charter, this provision was incorporated into the GATT and became the
present-day paragraph ten of GATT Article XXIV. “The sole difference is that for the
approval[,] the GATT requires a two-thirds majority of ‘members’ whereas the Charter
required the same majority of ‘members present and voting.’” Choi, supra note 11, at 838.
75. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov.
21, 1947–Mar. 24, 1948, Report of Committees and Principle Sub-Committees of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, at 52, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/8
(Sept. 1948).
76. See id. at 51, ¶ 23.
77. See Choi, supra note 11, at 839.
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was not.78 When Nicaragua submitted its notice of the RTA to the GATT
Secretariat, it used the paragraph-10 mechanism to request permission to
enter into an RTA with a non-GATT state. 79 The GATT Contracting
Parties granted Nicaragua’s request for permission to form the FTA, but
instituted an annual review:
The CONTRACTING PARTIES decide, in accordance with the provisions of
Article XXIV, paragraph 10, of the General Agreement, that the Government of
Nicaragua is entitled to claim the benefits of the provisions of Article XXIV of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade relating to the formation of freetrade areas, and decide to review the above decision, if at any time after study of
reports furnished by the Government of Nicaragua and of other relevant data,
they find that the operation of the Free-Trade Treaty is not resulting in the
maintenance of a free-trade area in the sense of Article XXIV of the General
Agreement.80

By this decision, the contacting parties approved the RTA, subject
to review of the submitted reports to ensure that the parties continued to
meet the other requirements of Article XXIV.81 The decision illustrates
the “approval and control” mechanism envisioned by the drafters of
paragraph 10.82
The “approval and control” mechanism was also employed when
Nicaragua decided to join the Central American Free Trade Area
(CAFTA).83 Some of the parties to the CAFTA—Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras—had not acceded to the GATT at the time, so
Nicaragua again requested permission from the GATT contracting
parties.84 As before, the parties approved the agreement, but reserved the
possibility of withdrawing that approval contingent on subsequent
developments. 85 The approval given this time further reinforced the
“control” side of the “approval and control” mechanism by setting a
78. Nicaragua acceded to the GATT on May 28, 1950, and El Salvador acceded to
the GATT/WTO on May 7, 1995. See Choi, supra note 11, at 840, nn.57–58.
79. See id. at 839.
80. The Free-trade Area Treaty between Nicaragua and El Salvador, Oct. 25, 1951,
GATT B.I.S.D. (Vol. II) at 30 (1952).
81. The review procedure regarding the approval of Nicaragua’s accession to the
CAFTA, which was expected to occur in 1961, seems to have been aborted; there is no
record of such a review. See Choi, supra note 11, at 839–41.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 840.
84. See id.
85. See Participation of Nicaragua in Central American Free-trade Area, Nov. 13,
1956, GATT B.I.S.D. (5th Supp.) at 29, 30 (1957) (“The CONTRACTING PARTIES
[d]ecide, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 10 of Article XXIV, that the
Government of Nicaragua is entitled to claim the benefits of the provisions of Article
XXIV relating to the formation of free-trade areas, and [d]ecide to review this Decision by
1 January 1961 and at any time thereafter if, after study of reports and of the plan and
schedule submitted by the Government of Nicaragua, they find that the establishment of a
free-trade area in the sense of Article XXIV is unlikely to result within ten years of the
entry into force of the Treaty.”).
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specific timeframe of five years for the review of the approval, followed
by subsequent review on a necessary basis. 86 This five-year review
period was meant to induce non-GATT states to join the GATT.87 Failure
to accede to the GATT, however, did not automatically lead to a decision
to withdraw the approval.88
Subsequent examples of the paragraph-10 mechanism in action are
few and far between.89 Because of the highly political nature of the RTA
examination procedure in the GATT/WTO, a tacit practice seems to have
developed which limits the formal discussion of GATT consistency
issues among Working Parties when evaluating RTAs involving nonGATT/WTO states.90 This, however, does not seem to be a permanent
settlement of this issue. As shown in the above two cases, the possibility
for claims of inconsistencies in such RTAs has not been removed, and
some form of legal affirmation of those RTAs may continue to be
necessary.91
Revitalizing this approval and control mechanism by requiring
formal evaluations on RTAs would provide an alternative avenue of
reform. It could provide legal justification not only to the formation of
RTAs involving developing countries that are not WTO members, but
also to the formation of PTAs between developed and developing
countries. If WTO members were to agree on the regular approval of
such PTAs, it would effectively overcome the legal constraint imposed
by Article XXIV’s “substantially all the trade” requirement, which
prevents developed and less developed countries from using PTAs to
integrate their economies.
It should be noted, however, that the paragraph 10 mechanism
cannot serve as a permanent waiver of the obligation to fulfill the
“substantially all the trade” condition because paragraph 10 requires that
86. See id.
87. See Choi, supra note 11, at 840.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 840–41 (“[In the 1960s,] the number of countries willing to go through
the strict approval procedure of paragraph 10 rapidly increased . . . [and] this general trend
has become even stronger.”).
90. See id.
91. A document of record relevant to this issue involves the Interim Agreements of
bilateral FTAs between the EC and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It states: “[t]he
representative of Japan said that, despite the fact that Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were
not members of the WTO, his delegation expected them to respect the obligations of
GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.” Committee on Regional Trade Agreements,
Examination of the Interim Agreements between the European Communities and the Czech
Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania and the Free Trade
Agreements between the European Communities and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, ¶ 33
WT/REG1/M/2, WT/REG2/M/2, WT/REG7/M/2, WT/REG8/M/2, WT/REG9/M/2,
WT/REG18/M/2
(Oct.
3,
1997),
available
at
http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/do/www/readDoc?document_id=40590 (select
“WTREG18M2.doc”).
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proposals for the approval should “lead to the formation of a customs
union or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article.”92 Therefore, any
arrangement in RTAs that allows less developed parties to depart from
the “substantially all the trade” rule is unlikely to be permanent. But
developing-country parties to RTAs could be given more time than the
normal 10 years to eliminate trade barriers for a substantial number of
product sectors.93
Given the nature of this temporary exemption under the paragraph
10 mechanism, a permanent exemption from the “substantially all the
trade” rule can only be given by an amendment to the Enabling Clause
like the one proposed by this article. Alternatively, paragraph 10 could be
amended to exclude developing countries from the application of the
condition that “such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union
or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article,” so as to give a permanent
waiver in favor of developing countries when they form RTAs with
developed countries.
IV. CONCLUSION
In forming RTAs, WTO members need to take into account the legal
problems related to the MFN requirement. GATT Article XXIV provides
legal cover for RTAs that would otherwise be in violation of the MFN
requirement. The Enabling Clause provides added flexibility in favor of
developing countries, but only RTAs formed between WTO-member
developing countries can claim this flexibility. Consequently, developing
country members of the WTO lack the legal flexibility to favor other
developing countries that the commercial reality of development tends to
demand. This lack of flexibility limits the ability of less developed
countries to form RTAs with developed economies.
The solution to this lack of flexibility is to further “enable” the
Enabling Clause through an amendment that would expand the potential
reach of PTAs. Although GSPs have been offered as a means for granting
trade preferences, PTAs would be more effective. Because GSPs are
unilateral trade preferences, whereas PTAs are not completely unilateral,
more developed countries might be willing to grant trade preferences to
developing countries through PTAs if they were authorized, because
PTAs can also grant some trade preferences to developed countries in
return. Any LDC parties to such PTAs also deserve more differential and
favorable treatment.
92. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 10.
93. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, ¶ 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994),
available at http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/10-24_e.htm.
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Revitalizing the “approval and control” mechanism in GATT Article
XXIV could also significantly facilitate PTAs between developed and
developing countries. A consensus among WTO members on this issue
would help to temporarily overcome the legal constraint imposed by the
“substantially all the trade” requirement, which has discouraged
developed and less developed countries from making efforts to integrate
their economies. Amending the conditions in paragraph 10 would allow a
permanent exemption from the “substantially all the trade” rule to be
given for the benefit of developing countries striving to integrate their
less developed economies with those of developed countries in this era of
rapidly proliferating RTAs. Consequently, this would allow WTO
jurisprudence to align more closely with commercial reality and the
development needs of developing countries.

